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Abstract
Amodel of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be
chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody
prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features:
private information regarding valuations, varying intensities in the preference for one out-
come over the other, and the option to declare neutrality in order to avoid disagreement.
We uncover a variant on the “tyranny of the majority": there is always an equilibrium
in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their
will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive
minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large
enough. This equilibrium displays a “tyranny of the minority": it is always true that
the increased aggression of the minority more than compensates for smaller number,
leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the
majority alternative. In all cases the option to remain neutral ensures that the probabil-
ity of disagreement is bounded away from one (as group size changes), regardless of the
supermajority value needed for agreement, as long as it is not unanimity.
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1 Introduction
In many situations, a group of individuals must decide between alternative courses
of action, in a context where disagreement (not implementing a choice at all) is the
worst possible outcome for all concerned. Agovernment may need to formulate a long-
run response to terrorism: individuals may (strongly) disagree over the nature of an
appropriate response, but everyone would deplore complete inaction. An academic
department may need to make an offer to one of several candidates. Again, individuals
differ in their relative preferences but no one wants to see their slot taken away by the
Deanbecause they couldn’t agreeonanoffer. Jurymembers in theprocess ofdeliberation
may disagree on whether or not the defendent is guilty; however, in most cases they all
prefer to reach an agreement than to drag the deliberations on endlessly. And of course,
the bargaining literature presents a plethora of examples in which non-agreement is
universally regarded as a bad outcome.
The goal of this paper is to study a particular formulation of group decision-making
in the shadow of disagreement, one which we believe to be representative of many
real-world scenarios.1 We proceed as follows.
A group of n agents must make a joint choice from a set of two alternatives. Each
agentmust either name an alternative—A orB—or she can declare “neutrality", in that
she agrees to be counted, in principle, for either side. Once this is accomplished, we tally
declarations for each alternative, including the number of neutral announcements. If, for an
alternative, the resulting total is no less than some exogenously given supermajority, we
shall call that alternative eligible.
Because neutral annoucements are allowed for and tallied on both sides, all sorts of
combinations are possible: exactly one alternative may be eligible, or both, or neither. If
exactly one alternative is eligible, that alternative is implemented. If both are eligible —
as will typically be the case when there are a large number of neutrals — one alternative
is picked and implemented at random. If neither is eligible—whichwill happen if there
is a fierce battle to protect one’s favorite alternative — then no alternative is picked: the
outcome is disagreement.
The objective of the paper is to set up this model and study its equilibria.
Several features of the model deserve comment. First, while the specific formulation
is cast in terms of a voting model, we do not necessarily have voting in mind. The
exogenouslygiven supermajoritymayormaynot amount to full consensusorunanimity,
and in any case is to be interpreted as some preassigned degree of consensus that the
group needs to achieve.
1Thus it is not an axiomatic description of a normative or quasi-normative solution that we are after, as
in Nash bargaining, nor so we seek to implement a particular solution correspondence by the choice of a
mechanism.
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Second, the neutrality announcement is a novel feature of our model. Neutrality can
be interpreted in several ways.
• Approval voting. In our example of an Economics department deciding on a chair,
approval voting would mean that each faculty member is asked to submit the
name or names of those candidates, which he thinks are capable of acting as chair,
and that candidate which reaches some supermajority of the votes is elected chair.
In this example, a voter who approves both candidates is effectively declaring
neutrality.
• Informal group decision-making. As wementioned above, our model need not apply
only to formal voting institutions. What we also have in mind are everyday situa-
tions in which a collective of individuals need to decide between two alternatives.
In such situations it is often the case that some individuals, whodonot feel strongly
towards either alternative, declare that theywill go alongwith any alternative that
is picked by the others.
• Black box/Reduced form. One could imagine several informal mechanisms that help
individuals to avoid disagreement by allowing their vote to be counted in a way
that ensures a win to one of the alternatives. For example, one could delegate his
ballot to an impartial arbitrator, who appreciates the anxiety of all concerned to
avoid disagreement, and is therefore interested in implementing some outcome.
Therefore, one could interpret the neutrality declaration as the reduced form of
some unspecified procedure, which is used to help avoid unnecessary disagree-
ments.
Third, we are interested in the “intensity" of preference for one alternative over the
other, and how this enters into the decision to be neutral, or to fight for one’s favorite
outcome. Specifically, we permit each person’s valuations to be independent (and pri-
vate) draws from a distribution, and allow quite generally for varying cardinal degrees
of preference. A corollary of this formulation is that others are not quite sure of how
strongly a particular individual might feel about an outcome and therefore about how
that individual might behave. This is one way in which uncertainty enters the model.
Uncertainty also plays an additional role, in that no one is sure how many people
favor one given alternative over the other. To be sure, we assume that there is a common
prior— represented by an independent probability p—that an individualwill favor one
alternative (call it A) over the other (call it B). Without loss of generality take p ≤ 1/2.
If, in fact, p < 1/2 , one might say that it is commonly known that people of “typeA" are
in a minority, or more precisely in a stochastic minority.
We will see that these two types of uncertainty are very important for the results we
obtain.
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A major goal of the paper is to study equilibria that “favor” one side: either the
minority or the majority. It is intuitive — and we develop this formally in the analysis
— that in any equilibrium, each individual will use a cutoff rule: there will exist some
critical relative intensity of preference (forA overB or vice versa) such that the individual
will announce her favorite outcome if intensities exceed this threshold, and neutrality
otherwise. If the cutoff is lower, then a type may be viewed as being more “aggressive”:
she announces her own favorite outcome more easily (and risks disagreement with
greater probability). Thus, equilibria in which an individual of the majority type uses
a lower cutoff than an individual of the minority type may be viewed as favoring the
majority: we call them majority equilibria. Likewise, equilibria in which the minority
type uses a lower cutoff will be called minority equilibria.
One might use a parallel from the Battle of the Sexes (after all, in some sense, our
model is an enriched version of that game) to search for particular majority or minority
equilibria. For instance, might one not be able to sustain an equilibrium in which all
members of a particular type are “fully aggressive” (using the lowest possible cutoff)
while their opponents all timidly declare neutrality, regardless of valuation? The answer
is that such a configuration is indeed an equilibrium. But, aswe argue in detail in Section
3.2.2, this equilibrium fails a weak robustness or stability criterion. If the compatriots of,
say, a type-A individual do announce neutrality for a huge range of relative valuations
(rather than the entire range), it will push an individual type-A person to announce A
for a large range of valuations, thus rendering the “perfect neutrality” cutoff unstable
to the tiniest perturbations. As we shall see in Section 3.2.2, uncertainty about group
sizes plays a central and indispensable role in this result, though this is not the only
indispensable role played by uncertainty in this model.
Nevertheless, Proposition 1 establishes that a majority equilibrium — one satisfying
the robustness criterion just described — always exists. In this equilibrium, both sides
use “interior” cutoffs, but the majority uses a more aggressive cutoff than the minority.
This is an interesting manifestation of the “tyranny of the majority”. Not only are the
majority greater in number (or at least stochastically so), they are also more vocal in
expressing their opinion. In response — and fearing disagreement — the minority are
more cowed towards neutrality. So in majority equilibrium, group outcomes are doubly
shifted towards the majority view, once through numbers, and once through greater
voice.
We then turn tominority equilibria. Given the refinement described two paragraphs
ago, such equilibria do not generally exist; indeed, it is easy enough to find examples
of nonexistence. Yet Proposition 2 establishes the following result: if the required su-
permajority µ is not unanimity (i.e., µ < 1), and if the size of the stochastic minority
p exceeds 1 − µ , then for all sufficiently large population sizes, a minority equilibrium
must exist.
How large is large? To be sure, the answer must depend on the model specifics, but
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our computations suggest that in reasonable cases, population sizes of 8–10 (certainly
less than the size of a jury!) are enough for existence.
We found this result remarkable, though we confess that we do not understand it
fully. Inpart, it is intuitive. Aspopulation size increases, the two typesofuncertainty that
we described — uncertainty about type and uncertainty regarding valuation intensity
— tend to diminish under the strength of the Law of Large Numbers. This would do no
good if p < 1 − µ , for then the minority would neither be able to win, nor would it be
able to block the majority. [Indeed, Proposition 5 in Section 6.2 shows that if p < 1 − µ ,
then for large population sizes a minority equilibrium cannot exist.] But if p exceeds
1 − µ , the minority acquires “credibility" to block the wishes of the majority, or at least
does so when the population is large enough.
For two reasons, however, this notionof “credible blocking"doesnot forma complete
explanation. First, credible blocking is not tantamount to a credible win. Indeed, it is
easy to see that as µ goes up, the minority find it easier to block but also harder to win.
So the previous result must not be viewed as an assertion that the minority is “better
protected” by an increase in µ. As the example in Section 6.2makes clear, this is not true.
Nevertheless, insofar as existence is concerned, the fact that p > 1 − µ > 0 guarantees
existence for large population sizes.
Second, the case of unanimity remains open. The techniques used to prove Propo-
sition 2 do not work in that case, and indeed we conjecture that the result is false. That
is, we claim that one can write down a group decision model with unanimity in which
a minority equilibrium never exists, no matter what the population size is. We report
on this conjecture in Section 6.2. So blocking credibility alone does not translate into the
existence of a minority equilibrium in the unanimity case.
The next main result in the paper studies minority equilibrium. Recall that in the
majority equilibrium, the majority group will have a greater chance of implementing its
preferred outcome on two counts: greater voice, and greater number. Obviously, this
synergy is reversed for the minority equilibrium: there, the minority have greater voice,
yet they have smaller numbers. One might expect the net effect of these two forces to
result in some ambiguity. The intriguing content of Proposition 3 is that in a minority
equilibrium, the minority must always implement its favorite action with greater probability
than the majority. Voice more than compensates for number.
Our paper thus suggests that in group decision-making the outcomes tend to be
invariably biased in one direction or another. In majority equilibrium this is obvious.
But it is also true of minority equilibrium. This lends some support to the view that
group decision-making tends to have an extreme character of its own, something that
this model does share (but for subtler reasons) with the Battle of the Sexes.
One might criticize Proposition 3 on the grounds that it may be empty. Minority
equilibrium typically exist for large population sizes, but for such equilibria the proba-
bility of disagreement should be very large or approaching unity. [For instance, suppose
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that µ is very close to unity. Wouldn’t all outcomes be blocked?] Of course, this sort
of argumentation neglects the strategic nature of decision-making in this model. Indi-
vidual cutoffs vary endogenously with population size, after all. Indeed, Proposition 4
establishes that the probability of disagreement is not only strictly less than unity in all
equilibria and for all population sizes, it is bounded away from one as the population size
goes to infinity.2 Therefore Proposition 3 has a force that does not fade with increasing
population.
1.1 Related Literature
Onecentral result inourpaper is thatminoritiesmayfightmoreagressivelyandwin. One
might think that minorities put up a stronger fight due to a free-rider effect. However,
voting is costless in our model, and hence, groups are not subject to the classical free-
rider problem. Moreover, in the literature on costly voting (Ledyard (1984), Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983) and Campbell (1999)), even when the minority fights harder, the
majority still wins more often.
Of thesepapers, Campbell (1999) ismost related toours. In a costlyvotingmodelwith
two alternatives, this paper studies the following question: can “zealous"minorities win
in a majority vote despite their disadvantage in size? Although the focus of this paper is
different than ours, one important implication of his results can be contrasted with our
findings. When both groups are equally zealous, the unique equilibrium outcome for
large electorates involves theminority fightingmore aggressively, yet losing the election
more often than not.
An important feature of our model is that individuals base their decision on how
strongly they prefer one alternative to another. This feature is shared with several pa-
pers that investigate different mechanisms in which intensity of preferences determine
individual voting behavior. Vote-trading mechanisms, in which voters can trade their
votes with one another, have been analyzed in Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and have
more recently been revisited byPhilipson andSnyder (1996) andPiketty (1994). Cumula-
tive votingmechanisms inwhich each votermay allocate a fixed number of votes among
a set of candidates has been analyzed as early as in Dodgson (1884) and more recently
revisited by Morton and Rietz (1998) and Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003). Finally,
Casella (2003) introduces a mechanism of storable votes, in which voters can choose to
store votes in order to use them in situations that they feel more strongly about.
The above papers offer new mechanisms of voting and try to determine their nor-
mative properties. Our focus is different. Rather than offer a newmechanism, we claim
that issues of intensity of preferences exist in many real-life situations of group decision-
making. Our analysis highlights the importance of consensus and the fear of gridlock
2Once again, we need to assume that µ < 1. The unanimity case is discussed in Section 6.
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as a mechanism through which intensities of preferences are translated into the decision
making process. In this context, Ponsati and Sa´kovicz (1996) is also related to the present
paper. Indeed, their model is more ambitious in that they explicitly attempt to study
the dynamics of capitulation in an ambient environment similar to that studied here.
This leads to a variant on the war of attrition, and their goal is to describe equilibria
as differential equations for capitulation times, at which individuals cease to push their
favorite alternative.
Our paper is also connected to experimental literature on jury behavior. Several
studies performed by Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein (1998a, 1998b, 1999) on mock
juries have arrived at the following conclusions: (1) different juries are likely to reach
similar conclusions about the relative severity of different cases, and (2) juries do not
produce less erratic and more predictable awards than individuals. Although these
studies were performed on cases of punitive damages, rather than criminal cases (where
the decision is binary), the above findings can be interpreted in amanner consistent with
our results. First, the relative composition of the jury, whether the majority are white,
black, poor or rich, does not affect the jury’s decision in an unambiguous way. Put
differently, a jury may decide on the same punitive damages to a black plaintiff when
the majority of jury members are black as well as when the majority are white. Second,
if decisions made by juries were more predictable than ones made by individuals, then
one would expect that a randomly selected jury will most likely make a decision, which
conforms with the views of the majority in the population. Hence, the unpredictablity
of jury decisions can be interpreted as multiple equilibria: it is just as likely that the
minority will influence the decision of the jury, as it is that the majority will influence its
decision.
2 The Model
2.1 The Group Choice Problem
A group of n agents must make a joint choice from a set of two alternatives, which we
denote by A and B. The rules of choice are described as follows:
[1] Each agent must either name an alternative —A orB —or she can declare “neutral-
ity", in that she agrees to be counted, in principle, for either side.
[2] If the total number of votes for an alternative plus the number of neutral votes is
no less than some exogenously given supermajority m (> n/2), then we shall call that
alternative eligible.
[3] If no alternative is eligible, no alternative is chosen: a stateD (for “disagreement") is
the outcome.
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[4] If a single alternative is eligible, then that alternative is chosen.
[5] If both alternatives are eligible, A or B are chosen with equal probability.
2.2 Valuations
Normalizing the value of disagreement to zero, each individual will have valuations
(vA, vB) over A and B. These valuations are random variables, and we assume they are
private information. Use the notation (v, v′) , where v is the valuation of the favorite
outcome (max{vA, vB}), and v′ is the valuation of the remaining outcome (min{vA, vB}).
An individual will be said to be of type A if v = v(A) , and of type B if v = vB . [The case
vA = vB is unimportant as we will rule out mass points below.]
Our first restriction is
[A.1] Each individual prefers either outcome to disagreement. That is, (v, v′)  0 with
probability one.
In Section 6we explore the consequences of dropping the assumption that disagreement
is worse than either alternative.
In what follows we shall impose perfect symmetry across the two types except for
the probability of being one type or the other, which we permit to depart from 1/2. [The
whole idea, after all, is to study majorities and minorities.]
[A.2] A person is type A with (iid) probability p ∈ (0, 1/2] , and is type B otherwise.
Regardless of specific type, however, (v, v′) are chosen independently and identically
across agents.
2.3 The Game
First, each player is (privately) informed of her valuation (vA, vB). Conditional on this
information she decides to announce either A or B , or simply remain neutral and agree
to be counted in any direction that facilitates agreement. Because an announcement of
the opposite alternative (to a player’s type) is weakly dominated by a neutral stance,
we presume that each player either decides to vote her own type, or to be neutral.3 The
rules in Section 2.1 then determine expected payoffs.
3For a similar reason we need not include the possibility of abstention. Abstention (as opposed to
neutrality) simply increases the probability of disagreement, which all players dislike by assumption.
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Cutoffs
Consider a player of a particular type, with valuations (v, v′). Define q ≡ n − m. Notice
that our player only has an effect on the outcome of the game (that is, she is pivotal)
in the event that there are exactly q other players announcing her favorite outcome.
For, suppose there are more than q such announcements, say for A. Then B cannot be
eligible, andwhether or notA is eligible, our player’s announcement cannot change this
fact. So our player has no effect on the outcome. Likewise, if there are strictly less than
q announcements of A , then B is eligible whether or not A is, and our player’s vote (A
or neutral) cannot change the status of the latter.
Now look at the pivotal events more closely. One case is when there are precisely
q announcements in favor of A , and q + 1 or more announcements favoring B. In this
case, by staying neutral our agent ensures that B is the only eligible outcome and is
therefore chosen. By announcing A she guarantees that neither outcome is eligible, so
disagreement ensues. In short, by switching her announcement from neutral to A , our
agent creates a personal loss of v′.
In the second case, there are q announcements or less in favor of B. In this case, by
going neutral our agent ensures that A and B are both eligible, so the outcome is an
equiprobable choice of either A or B. On the other hand, by announcing A , our agent
guarantees that A is the only eligible outcome. Therefore by switching in this instance
from neutral to announcing A , our agent creates a personal gain of v − (v + v′)/2.
To summarize, let P+ denote the probability of the former pivotal event (q compa-
triots announcing A , q + 1 or more announcing B) and P− the probability of the latter
pivotal event (q compatriots announcing A , q or less announcing B). It must be empha-
sized that these probabilities are not exogenous. They depend on several factors, but
most critically on the strategies followed by the other agents in the group. Very soon
we shall look at this dependence more closely, but notice that even at this preliminary
stage we can see that our agent must follow a cutoff rule. For announcing A is weakly
preferred to neutrality if and only if
P−[v − (v + v′)/2] ≥ P+v′.
Define u ≡ v−(v+v′)/2v′ . Note that (by [A.1]) u is a well-defined random variable. Then
the condition above reduces to
P−u ≥ P+, (1)
which immediately shows that our agent will follow a cutoff rule using the variable u.
Notice that we include the extreme rules of always announcing neutrality (or always
announcing one’s favorite action) in the family of cutoff rules. [Simply think of u as
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a nonnegative extended real.] If a cutoff rule does not conform to one of these two
extremes, we shall say that it is interior.
By [A.2], the variable u has the same distribution no matter which type we are refer-
ring to. We assume
[A.3] u is distributed according to the atomless cdf F , with strictly positive density f on
(0,∞).
3.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
In this paper, we study symmetric equilibria: those in which individuals of the same
type employ identical cutoffs.
3.2.1 Symmetric Cutoffs
Assume, then, that all A-types use the cutoff uA and all B-types use the cutoff uB . We
can now construct the probability that a randomly chosen individualwill announceA: she
must be of type A , which happens with probability p , and she must want to announce
A , which happens with probability 1 − F (uA). Therefore the overall probability of
announcing A , which we denote by λA , is given by
λA ≡ p[1 − F (uA)].
Similarly, the probability that a randomly chosen individual will announce B is given
by
λB ≡ (1 − p)[1 − F (uB)].
With this notation in hand, we can rewrite the cutoff rule (1) more explicitly. First, add
P− to both sides to get
P−(1 + u) ≥ P+ + P−.
Assuming thatwe are studying this inequality for a person of typeA , the right-hand side
is the probability that exactly q individuals announce A , while the left-hand side is the
joint probability that exactly q individuals announce A and no more than q individuals
announce B. With this in mind, we see that the cutoff uA must solve the equation
(
n − 1
q
)
λqA
q∑
k=0
(
n − 1 − q
k
)
λkB(1−λA−λB)n−1−q−k(1+uA) =
(
n − 1
q
)
λqA(1−λA)n−1−q.
(2)
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Likewise, the cutoff uB solves
(
n − 1
q
)
λqB
q∑
k=0
(
n − 1 − q
k
)
λkA(1−λA−λB)n−1−q−k(1+uB) =
(
n − 1
q
)
λqB(1−λB)n−1−q.
(3)
We will sometimes refer to these cutoffs as “best responses", though it should be
clear that uA embodies not just a “response" by an individual but also an equilibrium
condition: that this individual response is equal to the cutoff employedbyall compatriots
of the same type.
3.2.2 A Simple Refinement
At this stage, an issue arises which wewould do well to deal with immediately. It is that
a symmetric cutoff of ∞ is always a best response for any type to any cutoff employed
by the other type, provided that q > 0. This is easy enough to check: if no member in
group A is prepared to declare A in any circumstance, then no A-type will find it in her
interest to do so as well. This is because (with q > 0) no such individual is ever pivotal.
Hence the “full neutrality cutoff” u = ∞ is always a best response. But it is an
unsatisfactory best response. The reason is that if the compatriots of, say, a type-A
individual do announceA for a tiny rangeof veryhighu-values, itwill push an individual
type-A person to announce A for a large range of u-values, thus rendering the cutoff
uA = ∞ “unstable”.
First let us give an intuitive argument for this. Consider an individual of typeA , and
let us entertain a small perturbation in the strategy of her compatriots: they use a very
large cutoff, but not an infinite one. Now, in the event that our agent is pivotal, it must
be that her group is very large with high probability, because her compatriots are only
participating to a tiny extent, and yet there are q participants in the pivotal case. This
means that groupA is likely towin (conditional on the pivotal event), and our individual
will want to declare A for a large range of her u-values. This shows the “instability” of
the cutoff uA = ∞.
This argument has a clean counterpart in the formal analysis. Once we allow for
compatriots (say, of type A) to use any interior cutoff uA , we have λA > 0 , so that (2)
reduces to the simpler form
q∑
k=0
(
n − 1 − q
k
)
λkB(1 − λA − λB)n−1−q−k(1 + u′A) = (1 − λA)n−1−q. (4)
where we’re denoting our individual’s cutoff by u′A as a reminder that we haven’t im-
posed the symmetry condition yet.
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If we divide λB by 1 − λA , we form the probability that a randomly chosen person
announces B conditional on her not announcing A. Let’s call this probability π:
π ≡ λB
1 − λA .
With this notation, (4) may be rewritten as
1
1 + u′A
=
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
πk(1 − π)m−1−k, (5)
where m , it will be recalled, is the size of the supermajority (n − q in other words).
Now imagine that all compatriots have a very large cutoff, so that uA is very big. Then
λA is close to zero, so that π  λB . So, by (5), u′A is bounded. This means that the
full-neutrality response is not robust to small perturbations away from full neutrality.
These arguments are a fortiori true in the special case of unanimity: q = 0. Indeed, it
is easy to check that full neutrality is never a best response in this case, so no robustness
arguments need to be invoked.
Note that invoking weak dominance does not rule out full neutrality. To see this
consider the profile in which both groups use a cutoff of zero and so are always voting
their type. In this case, when a voter of typeA is pivotal, he knows for sure that there are
more than q declarations of B. Therefore, this voter has a strict incentive to claim neu-
trality. Note however, that the above profile is the only profile against which neutrality
is a strict best response for every type.
3.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
In summary, then, the arguments of the previous section permit us to rewrite the equi-
librium conditions (2) and (3) as follows:
α(uA, uB) ≡ (1 + uA)
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
πk(1 − π)m−1−k = 1, (6)
and
β(uA, uB) ≡ (1 + uB)
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
σk(1 − σ)m−1−k = 1, (7)
where m = n − q , π ≡λB/1−λA , and σ ≡λA/1−λB .
We dispose immediately of a simple subcase: the situation in which there is simple
majority and n is odd, so that q precisely equals (n − 1)/2. The following result applies:
Observation 1 If q = (n − 1)/2 , there is a unique equilibrium which involves uA = uB = 0.
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To see why this must be true, consult (6) and (7). Notice that when q = (n − 1)/2 , it
must be that m − 1 = n − q − 1 = q. So the best responses must equal zero no matter
what the size of the other group’s cutoff. In words, there is no cost to announcing one’s
favorite outcome in this case. Recall that the only conceivable cost to doing so is that
disagreement might result, but in the pivotal case of concern to any player, there are
q compatriots announcing the favorite outcome, which means there are no more than
n − 1 − q = q opposing announcements. So disagreement is not a possibility.
In the remainder of the paper, then, we concentrate on the case in which a genuine
supermajority is called for:
[A.4] q < (n − 1)/2.
The following observations describe the structure of response functions in this situ-
ation. [A.1]–[A.4] hold throughout.
Observation 2 A symmetric response ui is uniquely defined for each uj , and declines continu-
ously as uj increases, beginning at some positive finite value when uj = 0 , and falling to zero as
uj → ∞.
Observation 3 Consider the point at which type A ’s response crosses the 450 line, or more
formally, the value u¯ at which α(u¯, u¯) = 1. Then typeB ’s best response cutoff to u¯ is lower than
u¯ , strictly so if p < 1/2.
While the detailed computations that support these observations are relegated to the
Appendix, a few points are to be noted. First, complete neutrality is never a (robust) best
response even when members of the other group are always announcing their favorite
alternative. The argument for this is closely related to the remarks made in Section 3.2.2
and we shall not repeat them here. On the other hand, “full aggression” — u = 0 — is
also never a best response except in the limiting case as the other side tends to complete
neutrality. These properties guarantee that every equilibrium (barring those excluded
in Section 3.2.2) employs interior cutoffs.
Observation 3 requires some elaboration. It states that at the point where the best
response of Group A leaves both sides equally aggressive (so that uA = uB = u¯), group B ’s
best response leads to greater aggression. The majority takes greater comfort from its
greater number, and therefore are more secure about being aggressive. There is less
scope for disagreement. However, note the emphasized qualification above. As we
shall see later, it will turn out to be important.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation. Each response function satisfies ob-
servation 2, and in addition observation 3 tells us that the response function for B lies
above that forA at the 450 line. We have therefore established the following proposition.
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Figure 1: Existence of a Majority Equilibrium
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists in which members of the stochastic majority — group B
— behave more aggressively than their minority counterparts: uB < uA.
Proposition 1 captures an interesting aspect of the “tyranny of the majority”. Not only
are the majority greater in number (at least stochastically so in this case), they are also
more vocal in expressing their opinion. So group outcomes are doubly shifted — in
this particular equilibrium— towards the majority view, once through numbers, and once
through greater voice.4 We will call such an equilibrium a majority equilibrium.
4Notice that this model has no voting costs so that free-riding is not an issue. Such free-riding is at the
heart of the famous Olson paradox (see Olson (1965)), in which small groups may be more effective than
their larger counterparts.
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Figure 2: Minority Equilibrium
4 Minority Equilibria
4.1 Existence
Figure 1,whichweused in establishingProposition 1, is drawn fromactual computation.
We set n = 4 , p = 0.4 , ν = 1/4 , and chose F to be gamma with parameters (3,4). Under
this specification, there is, indeed, a unique equilibrium and (by Proposition 1) it must
be the majority equilibrium.
Further experimentation with these parameters leads to an interesting outcome.
When n is increased, the response curves appear to “bend back” and intersect yet again,
this time above the 450 line (see Figure 2). Aminority equilibrium (in which uA < uB , so
that the minority are more aggressive) makes its appearance. For this example, it does
so when there are 12 players.
The bending-back of response curves to generate a minority equilibrium appeared
endemic enough in the computations, that we decided to probe further. To do this, we
study large populations in which the ratio of q to n is held fixed at ν ∈ (0, 1/2). More
precisely, we look at sequences {n, q} growing unboundedly large so that q is one of the
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(at most) two integers closest to νn. We obtain the following analytical confirmation of
the simulations:
Proposition 2 Assume that 0 < ν < p ≤ 1/2. Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞
and q is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. Then there exists a finite N such that for
all n ≥ N , a minority equilibrium must exist.
Several comments are in order. First, if there is a minority equilibrium, there must be
at least two of them, because of the end point restrictions implied by Observations 2 and
3. Some of these equilibria will suffer from stability concerns similar to those discussed
in Section 3.2.2. But there will always be other minority equilibria that are “robust” in
this sense.5
Second, it might be felt that the threshold N described in Proposition 2 may be too
large for “reasonable” group sizes. Our simulations reveal that this is not true. For
instance, within the exponential class of valuation distributions, the threshold at which
a minority equilibrium appears is typically around N = 10 or thereabouts, which is by
no means a large number.
Third, the qualification that ν > 0 is important. The unanimity case, with q = 0 is
delicate. We return to this issue in Section 6. The case p ≤ ν , which we also treat in
Section 6, is of interest as well.
Finally, as an aside, note that Proposition 2 covers the symmetric case p = 1/2 , in
which case the content of the proposition is that an asymmetric equilibrium exists (for
large n). To be sure, the proposition is far stronger than this assertion, whichwould only
imply (by continuity) that a minority equilibrium exists (with large n) if p is sufficiently
close to 1/2.
We can provide some intuition as to whyminority existence is guaranteed for large n
but not so for smalln. Observe thatwhenn is “small", there are two sorts of uncertainties
that plague any player. She does not know how many people there are of her type, and
she is uncertain about the realized distribution of valuations. Both these uncertainties
are troublesome in that they may precipitate costly disagreement. The possibility of
disagreement is lowered by more and more people adopting a neutral stance, though
after a point it will be lowered sufficiently so that it pays individuals to step in and
announce their favorite outcome. For a member of the stochastic majority, this point
will be reached earlier, and so a majority equilibrium will always exist.
On the other hand, when n is large, these uncertainties go away or at any rate are
reduced. Now the expectation that the minority will be aggressive can be credibly
self-fulfilling, because the expectation of an aggressive strategy can be more readily
transformed into the expectation of a winning outcome.
5Once again, this follows from the end-point restrictions.
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However, as already discussed in the Introduction, this intuition is not enough. Sec-
tion 6 has more to say on the matter.
Finally, compare and contrast this findingwith the asymmetric equilibria in the Battle
of the Sexes. Recall that analogues of those equilibria exist in this model as well, but they
have already been eliminated by the refinement introduced in Section 3.2.2. The equilibria
here, while driven by similar intuitive considerations, are not the same objects (indeed,
minority equilibria don’t always exist, as noted already). By permitting different and
heterogeneous valuations, as well as different group sizes, we obtain a more nuanced
description of when the double equilibrium actually comes into being.
4.2 Minorities Win in Minority Equilibrium
In this section we address the distinction between an equilibrium in which one group
behavesmore aggressively, and one in which that groupwinsmore often. For instance, in
themajority equilibrium themajorityfights harder andwinsmoreoften than theminority
does. [It cannot be otherwise, the majority are ahead both in numbers and aggression.]
But there is no reason to believe that the same is true of the minority equilibrium. The
minority may be more aggressive, but the numbers are not on their side.
However, a remarkable property of this model is that a minority equilibrium must
involve the minority winning with greater probability than the majority. Provided that a
minority equilibrium exists, aggression must compensate for numbers.
Proposition 3 In a minority equilibrium, the minority outcome is implemented with greater
probability than the majority outcome.
This framework therefore indicates quite clearly how group behavior in a given
situation may be swayed both by majority and minority concerns. When the latter
occurs, it turns out that we have some kind of “tyranny of the minority": they are so
vocal that they actually swing outcomes (in expectation) to their side.
The proof of this proposition is so simple that we provide it in the main text, in the
hope that it will serve as its own intuition.
Proof. Recall (6) and (7) and note that uA < uB in a minority equilibrium. It follows
right away that
∑q
k=0
(
m−1
k
)
πk(1−π)m−1−k > ∑qk=0 (m−1k )σk(1−σ)m−1−k , so that π < σ.
Expanding this inequality, we conclude thatλB(1−λB) < λA(1−λA). BecauseλA < 1/2 ,
this can only happen in two ways: either λB > 1 − λA , or λB < λA. The former case
is impossible, because λA and λB describe mutually exclusive events, so the latter case
must obtain. But this implies the truth of the proposition.
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5 The Probability of Disagreement
In the previous sectionwe established the existence of aminority equilibrium. However,
existence was guaranteed only for large n. Hence, for proposition 3 to have bite it must
be the case that for large n , the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one.
Our next proposition proves exactly that.
Proposition 4 Assume that 0 < ν < 12 . Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞ and q
is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. Then the probability of disagreement is bounded
away from one.
The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose that the probability of disagree-
ment is high. Then the probability that each group is blocking the supermajority of its
rival is also high. In particular, this means that group cutoffs are not wandering off to
infinity. On the other hand, we can see that if group A , for example, is blocking group
B , then the latter will be discouraged from making a B announcement. Doing so will
most likely lead to disagreement, while casting a neutral vote ensures an agreement on
A. This argument makes for high cutoffs, a contradiction to the bounded group cutoffs
that were asserted earlier in this paragraph.
In part, the formalization of the above intuition is easy, but the simultaneous move-
ments in population size and cutoffs necessitate a subtle argument. In particular, the
last implication — that cutoffs become large with population size — rests on arguments
regarding rates of change as a function of population. The reader is referred to the formal
proof for details.
What allows individuals to agree, even when there are great many of them, is the
option to remain neutral. This can be seen if we analyze a restricted version of ourmodel
inwhich individuals have only two options: A orB. We carry out this analysis in Section
6.1. There, we show that Proposition 4 ceases to hold.
Finally, note that the case of unanimity is not covered by Proposition 4. Just like the
counterpart of Proposition 3 involving unanimity, this question remains open.
6 Extensions
6.1 No Neutrality
In our opinion, when facedwith impending disagreement, the option of a neutral stance
is very natural. This is why we adopted this specification in our basic model. [As
discussed already, neutrality is not to be literally interpreted as a formal announcement.]
Nevertheless, itwouldbeuseful to see if the insights of the exercise are broadlypreserved
if announcements are restricted to be either A or B.
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We can quickly sketch such a model. An individual is now pivotal under two cir-
cumstances. In the first event, the number of people announcing her favorite outcome is
exactly q , which we assume to be less than (n−1)/2.6 By announcing her favorite, then,
disagreement is the outcome, while an announcement of the other alternative would
lead to that alternative being implemented. The loss, then, from voting one’s favorite
in this event is precisely v′ (recall that the disagreement payoff is normalized to zero).
In the second event, the number of people announcing the alternative is exactly q. By
announcing her favorite, she guarantees its implementation, while the other announce-
ment would lead to disagreement. So the gain from voting one’s favorite in this event
is v. Consequently, an individual will announce her favorite if
Pr(exactly q others vote for alternative)v ≥ Pr(exactly q others vote for favorite)v′.
Define w ≡ v/v′. Then equilibrium cutoffs wA and wB are given by the conditions
wAPr(|B| = q) ≥ Pr(|A| = q) (8)
and
wBPr(|A| = q) ≥ Pr(|B| = q) (9)
where |A| and |B| stand for the number ofA- andB-announcements out of n−1 individ-
uals, andwhere equalitymust hold in each of the conditions provided the corresponding
cutoff strictly exceeds 1, which is the lower bound for these variables.
In this variation of the model, it is obvious that at least one group must be “fully
aggressive" (i.e., its cutoff must equal one).7 Moreover, as long as we are in the case
q < (n−1)/2 , both groups cannot simultaneously be “fully aggressive": one of the cutoffs
must strictly exceed unity.
So, in contrast to our model, in which all (robust) equilibria are fully interior, the
equilibria here are at “corners" (full aggression on one side, full acquiescence on the
other) or “semi-corners" (full aggression on one side, interior cutoffs on the other). The
semi-corner equilibria are always robust in the sense of Section 3.2.2, and we focus on
these in what follows.8
In particular, to examine possible minority equilibria, set wA = 1. Then use the
equality version of (9) to assert that
wB =
(
p + (1 − p)H(wB)
(1 − p)[1 − H(wB]
)n−1−2q
(10)
6The case q = (n− 1)/2 is exactly the same as in Observation 1 for the main model. No matter what the
valuations are, each individual will announce her favorite outcome.
7Simply examine (8) and (9) and note that both right-hand sides cannot strictly exceed one.
8In contrast to our setup, the “full corner" equilibria may or may not be robust. We omit the details of
this discussion.
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in any such equilibrium, where H is the (assumed atomless) cdf of w , distributed on its
full support [1,∞).
It is easy to use (10) to deduce
Observation 4 [1] A semi-corner minority equilibrium exists if (n, q) are sufficiently large. [2]
In any minority equilibrium, the minority outcome is implemented with greater probability than
the majority outcome.
So the broad contours of our model can be replicated in this special case. This is
reassuring, because it reassures us of the robustness of the results. At the same time
this variation allows us to highlight the main implication of allowing voters to remain
neutral: absent neutrality voters may be locked into situations in which they are almost
certain to disagree. This is formalized in the next result.
Observation 5 Assume 0 < ν < p < 12 . Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞ and
q is one of the two integers closest to νn. Then there exists a sequence of semi-corner minority
equilibria for which the probability of disagreement coverges to one.
The above result demonstrates the importance of being neutral: neutrality allows the
players to avoid disagreement. Recall that Proposition 4 establishes that with neutrality,
the probability of disagreement at every interior equilibrium is bounded away from
one. Once the option of neutrality is taken away, the probability that players reach
a disagreement (at any interior equilibrium) must go to one along some sequence of
minority equilibria.
6.2 Supermajority Requirements and Minority Equilibrium
Up to this point we have focused on group size as a determinant of the existence of
minority equilibria. A related question is whether existence is affected by variations in
the supermajority rule.
Common intuition suggests that a higher supermajority requirement facilitates the
emergence of a minority equilibrium. Indeed, the comparative politics literature com-
pares different political systems and motivates what has been termed “consensus sys-
tems” (Lijphart (1999)) by the desire to protectminorities from the tyrany of themajority.
Ourmodel allows us to investigate the hypothesis discussed above. We have already
shown that when the supermajority is relatively high (i.e., mn > 1 − p), the existence of
minority equilibria is guaranteed for large n. The question is, whether the minority can
get its way when the supermajority requirement is relaxed. This is the subject of our
next proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume that 0 < p < ν < 12 . Consider any sequence {n, q} such that n → ∞
and q is one of the (at most) two integers closest to νn. Then there exists a finite N such that for
all n ≥ N , a minority equilibrium does not exist.
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Taken together, Propositions 2 and 5 may suggest a monotonic relation between the
supermajority requirement and the “power" of the minority. However, it is not clear
whether this is true in our model. To see why, consider an individual of type A and her
best response condition. Holding B ’s cutoff fixed, as q decreases, A ’s cutoff increases,
i.e., the group fights less aggressively. This follows from the fact that as q decreases, the
probability, that the B-types would block A from being chosen, increases. Because the
above effect of lowering q applies to both groups, it is not clear which group benefits
from this change.
To demonstrate the ambiguous effect of lowering q consider the following example:
let n = 1, 000 (in light of Proposition 3 we intentionally pick a large n), p = 0.4 and
consider the distribution function F (u) = 1 − 1√
ln(u+e)
. For q = 300 there exists a
minority equilibrium uA  1.35 and uB  80. However, for q = 10 there exists no
minority equilibrium.
The above example seems to suggest that for some distribution functions a minority
equilibrium may not exist when the supermajority requirement is close to unanimity.
Conjecture 1 Suppose m = n. There exists a family of distribution functions for which a
minority equilibrium does not exist for any n.
6.3 Known Group Size
In this section we comment on the implications of uncertainty regarding the size of
one’s group. For this purpose, we modify our model by assuming that it is common
knowledge that there are nA individuals of type A and nB > nA individuals of type B.
We retain all our other assumptions.
The first observation we make is that our arguments in Section 3.2.2 do not apply
to this new model. To see why, consider the case when all B types are voting for B ,
whereas only extreme A-types are voting for A. When an A-type knows exactly how
many B-types there are, he realizes that he can only create a disagreement by voting
for A. Therefore, when group sizes are known, the two corner equilibria are robust (in
the sense of Section 3.2.2). This suggests that the corner equilibria are unnatural in the
following sense: when facedwith some uncertainty about group sizes, some individuals
may still put up a fight.
Our second observation relates to the importance of group size in the emergence
of minority equilibria. Potentially, the existence of minority equilibria in our original
model may be due to two types of uncertainties that are relaxed in large groups. First, as
the number of individuals in the group increases, voters have a more accurate estimate
of the proportion of their types in the group. Second, as the population increases, each
individual has a better picture of the distribution of intensities among his compatriots.
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What if group sizes are known? Then it can easily be shown that the equilibrium
cutoff forone typedependonlyon theequilbriumcutoff of theother type. Moreprecisely,
an equilibrium (uA, uB) satisfies the following equations,
(1 + uA)
q∑
k=0
(
nB
k
)
(F (uB))
nB−k (1 − F (uB))k = 1
(1 + uB)
q∑
k=0
(
nA
k
)
(F (uA))
nA−k (1 − F (uA))k = 1
where nA < nB are the number of individuals of type A and B respectively.
It is straightforward to construct examples in which there does not exist a minority
equilibrium for small nA and nB. For instance, take F (u) = 1− 1√ln(u+e) , nA = 2, nB = 3
and q = 1. For these values there exists a unique interior majority equilibrium, uA ≈ 250
and uB ≈ 0.22. However, using arguments similar to those employed in Proposition 2
and 4, one can show that for large n a minority equilibrium exists and the probability of
disagreement is bounded away from one. By simple stochastic dominance arguments,
it can be shown that in any minority equilbrium the minority wins more often.
We conclude that certainty regarding the numbers of A and B types is not sufficient
to generate aminority equilibrium; evenwhen the numbers ofAand B types are known,
we still need n to be sufficiently large for the minority to prevail.
6.4 Types who prefer disagreement to the rival alternative
Suppose there exist types who rank disagreement above their second best alternative.
Clearly, voting for the preferred alternative is weakly dominant for these types. Hence,
in any interior equilibrium these individuals would vote their type. In this sense, incor-
porating these voters into ourmodel is equivalent to adding aggregate noise. We believe
that if the proportion of such types is sufficiently low, all of our results continue to hold.
7 Summary
We study a model of group decision-making in which one of two alternatives must be
chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody
prefers some alternative to disagreement.
Weuncover a variant on the “tyranny of themajority": there is always an equilibrium
in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their
will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive
minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large
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enough. This equilibrium displays a “tyranny of the minority": it is always true that
the increased aggression of the minority more than compensates for smaller number,
leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the
majority alternative.
These equilibria are not to be confused with “corner" outcomes in which a simple
failure of coordination allows any one group to be fully aggressive and another to be
completely timid, without regard to group size. Indeed, one innovation of this paper
is to show how such equilibria are entirely non-robust when confronted with varying
intensities of valuations, and some amount of uncertainty regarding such valuations.
[In fact, as we emphasize in the paper, minority equilibria don’t always exist, in sharp
contrast to the non-robust corner equilibria, which always do.]
Apart from uncertainty and varying valuation intensities, the option for a player
to remain neutral plays a crucial role in this paper. In all cases, the neutrality option
ensures that the probability of disagreement is bounded away from one (as group size
changes), regardless of the supermajority value needed for agreement, as long as it is
not unanimity. Apart from being of some intrinsic interest, this proposition also shows
that the “minority wins" result does not occur in unimportant contexts in which there is
widespread disagreement anyway.
8 Appendix
Proof of Observation 2. For concreteness, set i = A and j = B. Fix any uB ∈ [0,∞).
Recall that
π =
λB
1 − λA =
(1 − p)[1 − F (uB)]
1 − p[1 − F (uA)] ,
so that π is continuous in uA , with π → 1−F (uB) as uA → 0 , and π → (1−p)[1−F (uB)]
as uA → ∞. Consequently, recalling (6) and noting that q < (n − 1)/2 , we see that
α(uA, uB) converges to a number strictly less than one as uA → 0 , while it becomes
unboundedly large as uA → ∞. By continuity, then, there exists some uA such that
α(uA, uB) = 1 , establishing the existence of a cutoff.
To show uniqueness, it suffices to verify that α is strictly increasing in uA. Because
the expression
∑q
k=0
(
m−1
k
)
πk(1 − π)m−1−k must be decreasing in π , it will suffice to
show that π itself is declining in uA , which is a matter of simple inspection.
To show that the response uA strictly decreases in uB , it will therefore be enough to
establish that α is also increasing in uB . Just as in the previous paragraph, we do this by
showing that π is decreasing in uB , which again is a matter of elementary inspection.
Finally, we observe that uA ↓ 0 as uB ↑ ∞. Note that along such a sequence, π → 0
regardless of the behavior of uA. Consequently,
∑q
k=0
(
m−1
k
)
πk(1 − π)m−1−k converges
to 1 as uB ↑ ∞. To maintain the equality (6), therefore, it must be the case that uA ↓ 0.
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Of course, all these arguments hold if we switch A and B.
Proof of Observation 3. Let u¯ be defined as in the statement of this Observation. Define
λ¯A ≡ p[1 − F (u¯)] and λ¯B ≡ (1 − p)[1 − F (u¯)]. Then
(1 + u¯)
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
π¯k(1 − π¯)m−1−k = 1, (11)
where π¯ ≡ λ¯B/(1 − λ¯A). Now recall that σ in (7) is defined by σ = λA1−λB , so that if we
consider the corresponding value σ¯ defined by setting uA = uB = u¯ , we see that
σ¯ ≤ π¯ if and only if λ¯A(1 − λ¯A) ≤ λ¯B(1 − λ¯B).
But λA ≤ 1/2 (because p ≤ 1/2), so that the second inequality above holds if and only if
λ¯A ≤ λ¯B , and this last condition follows simply from the fact that p ≤ 1/2.
So we have established that σ¯ ≤ π¯. It follows that
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
π¯k(1 − π¯)m−1−k ≤
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
σ¯k(1 − σ¯)m−1−k
and using this information in (11), we must conclude that
β(u¯, u¯) = (1 + u¯)
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
σ¯k(1 − σ¯)m−1−k ≥ 1, (12)
Recalling that β is increasing in its first argument (see proof of Observation 2), it follows
from (12) that type B ’s best response to u¯ is no bigger than u¯.
Finally, observe that all these arguments applywith strict inequalitywhen p < 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 1. For each uB ≥ 0 , define φ(uB) by composing best responses:
φ(uB) isB ’s best response toA ’s best response to uB . By Observation 2, we see thatA ’s
best response is a positive, finite value when uB = 0 , and therefore so isB ’s response to
this response. Consequently, φ(0) > 0. On the other hand,A ’s best response is precisely
u¯ when uB = u¯ , and by Observation 3 we must conclude that φ(u¯) < u¯. Because φ is
continuous (Observation 2 again), there is u∗B ∈ (0, u¯) such that φ(u∗B) = u∗B . Let u∗A be
typeA ’s best response to u∗B . Then it is obvious that (u
∗
A, u
∗
B) is an equilibrium. Because
u∗B < u¯ , we see from Observation 2 that u
∗
A > u¯. We have therefore found a majority
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any sequence {n, q} as described in the statement of
the proposition. Because p > ν , there exists a cutoff u¯A > 0 and a finite n∗ such that for
all n ≥ n∗ ,
λ¯A ≡ p [1 − F (u¯A)] > q
n − 1  ν. (13)
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Note that there is also an associated sequence {m} defined by m ≡ n − q.
We break the proof up into several steps.
Step 1. We claim that there exists an integerM such that for eachm ≥ M there is umB < ∞
that solves the following equation:
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
(πm)
k (1 − πm)m−1−k = 11 + u¯A (14)
where
πm ≡ λ
m
B
1 − λ¯A
and
λmB ≡ (1 − p) [1 − F (umB )] .
We prove this claim. Note that for all n ≥ n∗ , 1 − p ≥ p > q/(n − 1) , so that
π¯ ≡ (1 − p)(n − 1)
m − 1 >
q
m − 1 
ν
1 − ν
for all n ≥ n∗. Consequently, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN),
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
π¯k (1 − π¯)m−1−k → 0
as m and q grow to infinity. It follows that there exists M such that for all m ≥ M (and
associated q),
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
π¯k (1 − π¯)m−1−k < 1
1 + u¯A
. (15)
For such m , provisionally consider umB = 0. Then
λmB
1 − λ¯A
=
1 − p
1 − p [1 − F (u¯A)] ,
and using this in (13), we conclude that
πm =
λmB
1 − λ¯A
=
1 − p
1 − p [1 − F (u¯A)] >
(1 − p) (n − 1)
m − 1 = π¯.
Combining this information with (15), we see that if umB = 0 , then
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
πkm (1 − πm)m−1−k <
1
1 + u¯A
. (16)
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Next, observe that if umB is chosen very large, then λ
m
B and consequently πm are both
close to zero, so that
∑q
k=0
(
m−1
k
)
πkm (1 − πm)m−1−k is close to unity. It follows that for
such umB ,
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
πkm (1 − πm)m−1−k >
1
1 + u¯A
. (17)
Combining (16) and (17) and noting that the LHS of (14) is continuous in umB , it follows
that for all m ≥ M there exists 0 < umB < ∞ such that the claim is true.
Step 2. One implication of (14) in Step 1 is the following assertion: as (m, q) → ∞ ,
πm → ν/(1 − ν) ∈ (0, 1), and in particular, umB is bounded. (18)
To seewhy, note that 11+u¯A ∈ (0, 1). Using (14) andSLLN, itmust be thatπm → ν/(1−ν) ∈
(0, 1) as (m, q) → ∞. Recalling the definition of πm it follows right away that umB must
be bounded.
Step 3. Next, we claim there exists an integer M∗ such that
For all m ≥ M∗, umB > u¯A. (19)
To establish this claim, note first, using (13), that
p [1 − F (u¯A)] > q
n − 1 =
q
m−1
1 + qm−1
≥
q
m−1
1−p
p +
q
m−1
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that p ∈ (0, 12] , so that 1−pp ≥ 1.
A simple rearrangement of this inequality shows that
(1 − p) [1 − F (u¯A)]
1 − p [1 − F (u¯A)] >
q
m − 1 
ν
1 − ν (20)
Now suppose, contrary to the claim, that umB ≤ u¯A along some subsequence of m. Then
on that subsequence,
πm =
λmB
1 − λ¯A
=
(1 − p) [1 − F (umB )]
1 − p [1 − F (u¯A)] ≥
(1 − p) [1 − F (u¯A)]
1 − p [1 − F (u¯A)] (21)
Combining (20) and (21), we may conclude that along the subsequence of m for which
umB ≤ u¯A ,
inf
m
πm >
ν
1 − ν ,
which contradicts (18) of Step 2.
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Toprepare for thenext step, let uˆmB denote the best response of theB-types touA = u¯A.
That is,
1
1 + uˆmB
=
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
σkm (1 − σm)m−1−k , (22)
where
σm ≡ λ¯A
1 − λˆmB
and
λˆ
m
B ≡ (1 − p) [1 − F (uˆmB )]
Step 4. There is an integer M∗∗ such that for all m ≥ M∗∗ , uˆmB > umB .
To prove this claim, suppose on the contrary that uˆmB ≤ umB along some subsequence
of m. [All references that follow are to this subsequence.] Then
σm =
λ¯A
1 − λˆmB
=
p [1 − F (u¯A)]
1 − (1 − p) [1 − F (uˆmB )] ≥
p [1 − F (u¯A)]
1 − (1 − p) [1 − F (umB )] =
λ¯A
1 − λmB
. (23)
Recall from(18), Step2, that λ
m
B
1−λ¯A →
ν
1−ν . Thereforeλ
m
B → λ¯B ,where λ¯B ≡ ν1−ν
(
1 − λ¯A
)
.
Recall from (13) that λ¯A > ν , so that λ¯B < ν and in particular λ¯B < λ¯A. Because p ≤ 1/2 ,
so is λ¯A , and these last assertions permit us to conclude that λ¯A
(
1 − λ¯A
)
> λ¯B
(
1 − λ¯B
)
,
or equivalently, that
λ¯A
1 − λ¯B
>
λ¯B
1 − λ¯A
.
Using this information in (23) and recalling that λmB → λ¯B , we may conclude that
lim inf
m→∞ σm ≥
λ¯A
1 − λ¯B
>
λ¯B
1 − λ¯A
=
ν
1 − ν ,
where the last equality is from (18). It follows from (22) that uˆmB → ∞. But this contradicts
our supposition that uˆmB ≤ umB (that along a subsequence) because the latter is bounded;
see (18) of Step 2.
To complete the proof of the proposition, define, for each m ≥ M∗∗ and each uA ∈
(0, u¯A] , ψm(uA) as the difference between B ’s best response to uA and the value of uB
to which uA is a best response. By Step 1 and Observation 2, ψm is well-defined and
continuous on this interval. Using Observation 2 yet again, it is easy to see that (for
each m) ψm(uA) < 0 for small values of uA , while Step 4 assures us that ψm(u¯A) > 0.
Therefore for each m , there is u˜mA ∈ (0, u¯A) such that ψm(u˜mA ) = 0. If we define u˜mB to be
the best response to u˜mA , it is trivial to see that (u˜
m
A , u˜
m
B ) constitutes an equilibrium.
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Finally, note that
u˜mA < u¯A < u
m
B < uˆ
m
B < u˜
m
B ,
where the second inequality follows fromStep 3, the third inequality fromStep 4, and the
last inequality from the fact that the best response function is decreasing (Observation
1). This means that (u˜mA , u˜
m
B ) is a minority equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that q < n−12 (When q =
n−1
2 the probability of disagree-
ment is zero). Note that the probability of disagreement is equal to Pr(|A| > q, |B| > q) ,
where |.| stands for cardinality. Because
Pr(|A| > q, |B| > q) ≤ min{Pr(|A| > q),Pr(|B| > q)},
it suffices to show that Pr(A > q) and Pr(B > q) cannot both converge to one along
some subsequence of n.
Suppose, on the contrary, that Pr(A > q) = 1 and Pr(B > q) = 1 does converge to
one along some subsequence of n (retain notation). The proof proceeds in two steps. In
the first step we show that for large n both λA and λB are strictly above ν. Moreover, if
either λA or λB converges to ν , then it converges at a rate slower than 1√n . In the second
step we show that this implies that the equilibrium cutoffs, uA and uB,must be growing
to infinity, in contradiction to step 1.
Step 1. limn→∞
(λA−ν)
√
n√
λA(1−λA)
= ∞ and limn→∞ (λB−ν)
√
n√
λB(1−λB)
= ∞.
We prove limn→∞
|λA−ν|
√
n√
λA(1−λA)
= ∞; similar arguments hold for λB.
Assume to the contrary that thereexists a subsequence forwhich limn→∞
(λknA −ν)
√
n√
λA(1−λA)
=
c , where −∞ ≤ c < ∞.
Let Xn denote the number of A announcements (i.e., |A|). By the Berry-Esse´en The-
orem (see, for example, Feller (1986, Chapter XVI.5, Theorem 1)), for some ε < Φ(−c),
there exists an N such that for n > N
Pr(Xn > q) = Pr(
Xn − nλknA√
nλknA (1 − λknA )
>
−(λknA − ν)
√
n√
λknA (1 − λknA )
) < 1 − Φ(−c) + ε < 1
and this contradicts our premise that limn→∞ Pr(|A| > q) = 1.
Recalling thatπ = λB1−λA andσ =
λA
1−λB , it follows fromstep1 that limn→∞
(π− ν1−ν )
√
n√
π(1−π) =
∞ and limn→∞ (σ−
ν
1−ν )
√
n√
σ(1−σ) = ∞.
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Step 2. If limm→∞
(π− ν1−ν )
√
m−1√
π(1−π) = ∞ and limm→∞
(σ− ν1−ν )
√
m−1√
σ(1−σ) = ∞, then uA −→ ∞
and uB −→ ∞.
As in step 1 we provide a proof for uA and similar arguments follow for uB.
LetYn be the sumof successes fromabinomialdistributionwithprobability of success
π and with m − 1 draws. Then
q∑
k=0
(
m − 1
k
)
πk(1 − π)m−1−k = Pr(Yn ≤ q) ≤ Pr(|Yn − (m − 1)π| ≥ (m − 1)π − q)
<
V ar(Yn)
((m − 1)π − q)2 =
1
(
(π− q
m−1 )
√
m−1√
π(1−π) )
2
→ 0,
where the last inequality is by Chebyshev’s inequality and the limit follows from the
premise. Therefore, by (6) it must be that uA → ∞. This implies that λA → 0 , in
contradiction to step 1.
Proof of Observation 4. To prove part [1], define δ ≡ 1/(n − 1 − 2q) , and rewrite (9) as
(1 + wδB)[1 − H(wB)] = 1/(1 − p). (24)
Notice that whenwB = 1 , the LHS of (24) equals 2, while the RHS is strictly smaller than
2 (because p < 1/2).
Now suppose that there is some w such that the LHS of (24), evaluated at wB = w ,
is strictly less than 1/(1 − p). In this case, consider some intersection x = wB of the
function (1+xδ)[1−H(x)]with the value 1/(1− p) , along with the value wA = 1. It can
be verified that such an intersection constitutes a semi-corner minority equilibrium.
It remains to show that the condition in the first line in the previous paragraph is
satisfied for all (n, q) large enough. To this end, fix somew such that1−H(w) < 1/2(1−p).
Now take (n, q) to infinity and notice that δ → 0. Therefore wδ converges to 1. It follows
that for large (n, q) ,
(1 + wδ)[1 − H(w)] < 1/(1 − p),
and we are done.
Note that part [2] is trivially true for corner minority equilibria. To prove part [2]
for semi-corners, note that the probability that the minority outcome is implemented is
given by
Pr (|A| ≥ m) =
n∑
k=m
(
n
m
)
[p + (1 − p)H (wB)]k [(1 − p) (1 − H (wB))]n−k
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Similarly,
Pr (|B| ≥ m) =
n∑
k=m
(
n
m
)
[(1 − p) (1 − H (wB))]k [p + (1 − p)H (wB)]n−k
Thus,Pr (|A| ≥ m) > Pr (|B| ≥ m) if andonly if (1−p) (1 − H (wB)) < p+(1−p)H (wB) ,
which may be rewritten as
1
2(1 − p) > 1 − H (wB) (25)
Now (24) tells us that
1 − H (wB) = 1(1 − p) (1 + wδB)
where wB > 1. Hence, (1 − p)
(
1 + wδB
)
> 2(1 − p) , which implies (25).
Proof of Observation 5. Let w∗B be the solution to the following equation:
p + (1 − p)H(w∗B) = (1 − p) [1 − H(w∗B)]
Notice that w∗B is well-defined and greater than 1, as long as p < 1/2. We now proceed
in two steps.
Step 1. There exists a sequence of semi-corner minority equilibria that converges to
(1, w∗B). To see this, note that when wB = w
∗
B the RHS of (10) is smaller than the LHS.
For any ε > 0 , set wB = w∗B + ε. Because
p+(1−p)H(w∗B+ε)
(1−p)[1−H(w∗B+ε)]
> 1 , there exists N (ε) < ∞
such that for all n ≥ N (ε) , the LHS of (10) is strictly greater than its RHS. It follows that
for all n ≥ N (ε) , there exists an equilibrium (1, wnB) where wnB ∈ (w∗B, w∗B + ε).
Step 2. By Step 1, as n → ∞ , the probabilities with which a random voter votes for A
or for B (along the above sequence of semi-corner minority equilibria) both converge
to 1/2. In particular, there exists an N above which these probabilities are bounded
below by ν¯ > ν and above by 1 − ν¯. The probability of disagreement is equal to 1 −
Pr (|A| ≥ m)−Pr (|B| ≥ m). We now show that Pr (|A| ≥ m) goes to zero as n → ∞. By
essentially the same argument, Pr (|B| ≥ m) also goes to zero as n → ∞.
Recall that
Pr (|A| ≥ m) =
n∑
k=m
(
n
m
)
[p + (1 − p)H (wB)]k [(1 − p) (1 − H (wB))]n−k
Note that
∣∣m
n − (1 − ν)
∣∣ < 1n . Because 1 − ν¯ < 1 − ν it follows that for large enough n ,
1 − ν¯ < m
n
− η (26)
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for some η > 0. By stochastic dominance,
Pr (|A| ≥ m) ≤
n∑
k=m
(
n
m
)
(1 − ν¯)k (ν¯)n−k (27)
By inequality (26) and the SLLN, the RHS of (27) goes to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose on the contrary that a minority equilibrium (unA, u
n
B)
exists along some subsequence of n (all references that follow are to this subsequence).
Then limn→∞(unA, u
n
B) is either (∞,∞) , (0,∞) or a pair of strictly positive but finite
numbers (u∗A, u
∗
B). To prove that our supposition is wrong, we show that none of these
limits can apply.
Assume (unA, u
n
B) → (∞,∞). ThenλnA → 0 andλnB → 0. This implies thatπn → 0 and
σn → 0. But this implies, by equations (6) and (7) andusing SLLN, that (unA, unB) → (0, 0) ,
a contradiction.
Assume (unA, u
n
B) → (0,∞). Then λnA → p and λnB → 0 , so that σn → p < ν < qm−1 .
But using (7) and SLLN, this implies that unB → 0 , a contradiction.
Assume (unA, u
n
B) → (u∗A, u∗B) , where both u∗A and u∗B are strictly positive and finite.
Using SLLN and equations (6) and (7, it follows that πn and σn must both converge to
q
m−1 . This means that λ
n
A → λ∗A and λnB → λ∗B such that
λ∗B
1 − λ∗A
=
λ∗A
1 − λ∗B
This equlity holds only if λ∗A = λ
∗
B , or if λ
∗
A = 1 − λ∗B . Suppose the former is true. Then
πn → π∗ where
π∗ =
λ∗B
1 − λ∗A
<
ν
1 − ν 
q
m − 1
But the above inequality implies, by (6) andSLLN, thatunA → 0 , a contradiction. Suppose
next that λ∗A = 1 − λ∗B . But 1 − λ∗B > p > λ∗A , a contradiction.
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